SN 24.36

Nevahotinanahotisutta

Sāvatthinidānaṁ. “Kismiṁ nu kho, bhikkhave, sati, kiṁ upādāya, kiṁ abhinivissa evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’”ti? “Bhagavaṁmūlakā no, bhante, dhammā …pe…

Neither Still Exists Nor No Longer Exists

At Sāvatthī. “Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does the view arise: ‘A realized one neither still exists nor no longer exists after death’?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

“Rūpe kho, bhikkhave, sati, rūpaṁ upādāya, rūpaṁ abhinivissa evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’”ti. “Vedanāya sati … saññāya sati … saṅkhāresu sati … viññāṇe sati, viññāṇaṁ upādāya, viññāṇaṁ abhinivissa evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’ti.

“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, the view arises: ‘A realized one neither still exists nor no longer exists after death.’ When feeling … perception … choices … consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, the view arises: ‘A realized one neither still exists nor no longer exists after death.’

Taṁ kiṁ maññatha, bhikkhave, rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti? “Aniccaṁ, bhante” …pe… vipariṇāmadhammaṁ, api nu taṁ anupādāya evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjeyya: ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’”ti? “No hetaṁ, bhante”. “Iti kho, bhikkhave, dukkhe sati, dukkhaṁ upādāya, dukkhaṁ abhinivissa evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’”ti. “Vedanā … saññā … saṅkhārā … viññāṇaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti? “Aniccaṁ, bhante” …pe… vipariṇāmadhammaṁ, api nu taṁ anupādāya evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjeyya: ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’”ti? “No hetaṁ, bhante”. “Iti kho, bhikkhave, dukkhe sati, dukkhaṁ upādāya dukkhaṁ abhinivissa evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’”ti.

What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “And so, when suffering exists, because of grasping suffering and insisting on suffering, the view arises: ‘A realized one neither still exists nor no longer exists after death.’” … “Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would such a view arise?” “No, sir.” “And so, when suffering exists, because of grasping suffering and insisting on suffering, the view arises: ‘A realized one neither still exists nor no longer exists after death.’”