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Vayikra Dibbura DeChovah, Chapter 14
Vayikra Dibbura DeChovah, Chapter 14
1) (Vayikra 5:5): "Then it shall be, if he be guilty for one of these, then he shall confess where he has sinned." Whence is it derived that he is liable for each one of these ("hearing the voice, etc.") utterance of the lips, and tumah of the sanctuary and its consecrated objects) individually, and that all three are not required for liability? From "for one." Each one is implied (in all of its possible applications).
2) I might think that for tumah of the sanctuary and of its consecrated objects, which is punishable by kareth ("cutting-off"), there is liability for each one, whereas for "hearing of the voice" and "utterance of the lips" which are not punishable by kareth, there is liability for one (offering) alone; it is, therefore, written "for one." Each one is implied.
3) I might think that for tumah of the sanctuary and of its consecrated objects there is liability for one alone. Whence do I derive that there is liability for each even in one act of "hiddenness"? From "for one." Each one is implied.
4) I might think that for all of "tumah of the sanctuary" he is liable only for one (even if he entered and returned and entered (again) and became aware in the middle)
5) — How so? If he became tamei and was aware of it, and the tumah was "hidden" from him, and he entered the sanctuary and left, and became aware of it, whence is it derived that he is liable for each one (i.e., for each episode of awareness)? From "for one." Each one is implied.
6) I might think that for all of "tumah of consecrated objects" he is liable only for one; it is, therefore, written "for one." Each one is implied. How so? If he became tamei and then became aware, and then it were hidden from him, and he ate consecrated food, and then became aware, whence is it derived that he is liable for each one? From "for one." For each one is implied.
7) I might think that for tumah of the sanctuary and of its consecrated objects, which are subject to kareth, he is liable for each one; but for "hearing the voice" or "utterance of the lips," which are not subject to kareth, he is liable for only one —