Sifra 2.0.19

Vayikra Dibbura DeChovah, Section 8

1) (Vayikra 5:1) ("And if a soul sinned and heard the voice of an oath, and he was a witness or saw or knew — if he does not tell, then he shall bear his sin.") If it were written (only) "he heard the voice," and not "of an oath," I might think the intent of the verse to be that if one overheard a man telling his neighbor "Let us go and serve idolatry," and he could have testified in beth-din to this effect and failed to do so, ("I might think") that he is liable. — Now if one who (only) says this ("Let us go and serve, etc.") is not liable, should the one who just overhears it be liable (for withholding testimony)! It must be, then, that the verse is speaking of one being besworn in beth-din not to withhold testimony, and withholding it, in which instance the sayer (i.e., the beswearer himself) is not liable (even if he knows that the oath will be violated) and the hearer is liable (for its violation).

2) You, too, do not wonder that even though one who tells his neighbor "Let us go and serve idolatry" is not liable, the hearer (if he does not testify to this) is liable. To this end, it is written "and he heard the voice of an alah," an alah being an oath, viz. (Bamidbar 5:21): "Then the Cohein shall beswear the woman with the oath of the alah." This tells me only of an oath accompanied by an alah (lit., a curse). Whence do I derive the same for an oath unaccompanied by an alah? From "and heard the alah" - "and heard the voice" ("of an oath"), equating an oath unaccompanied by an alah to an oath accompanied by an alah.

3) R. Akiva says: This tells me only of an instance in which he is besworn by others intentionally (this being the common instance). Whence do I derive the same for an instance in which he is besworn by others unintentionally or by himself unintentionally? From: "and he was a witness or saw or knew," which connotes all of the above.

4) If one sent to them (the witnesses) his son, his servant or his messenger (to make his claim) or if the claimee said to them: "I beswear you that if you know testimony for him (the claimant) you come and testify for him," I might think that they are liable; it is, therefore, written "if he does not tell, he shall bear his sin," ("not" being written plene (lamed, vav, aleph), to be expounded: "If to him (lamed vav), i.e., to the claimant, he dos not (lamed aleph) tell, etc.")

5) If one said to two (witnesses): I beswear you and you that if you have testimony for me that you come and testify for me, and they have testimony for him — one witness from the mouth of another witness, or if one of them were kin (to the claimant) or unfit (to testify) — I might think that they were liable, (being acceptable to the claimee; for if not, this is simply an instance of denial of the claim), it is, therefore, (to negate this) written "if he does not tell (i.e., bear witness)" — when they are fit to bear witness, and not when they are unfit to do so.

6) If one arose in the synagogue and said (to the congregation containing his witnesses): "I beswear you if you have testimony for me, that you come and testify for me," I would think that if they denied it (in beth-din) they were liable; it is, therefore, (to negate this) written "and he heard the voice of an oath," implying that he must designate them, specifically.

7) If one said (beswearing them): "When you have testimony for me come and testify for me," (and they did not come), I might think that they were liable. It is, therefore, written "and he heard the voice of an oath and he was (i.e., had been) a witness" — when the witnessing preceded the oath and not when the oath preceded the witnessing.

8) And whence is it derived that the claim in question is only a money claim? R. Eliezer said: "Ors are stated here ("or saw or knew") and "ors" are stated in respect to (denying) a pledge [pikadon] (Vayikra 5:21: "or (denying) a deposit or a theft"). Just as the "ors" stated in respect to a pledge involve only money claims, so the "ors" stated here (in respect to withholding testimony) involve only money claims. — This is refuted by the "ors" of a murderer (Bamidbar 35:20): "or if in hatred he thrust him or hurled at him in ambush"), which are "ors" but do not involve money claims. —

9) We derive "ors" accompanied by an oath (as in our case) from "ors" accompanied by an oath (as in the case of a pledge), and the "ors" of a murderer are no refutation, their not being accompanied by an oath. — This is refuted by the "ors" of sotah (Bamidbar 5:14: "or there had passed over him a spirit of rancor" (Bamidbar 5:30) "or a man if there pass over him, etc."), which are "ors" accompanied by an oath but do not involve money claims.

10) — We derive "ors" accompanied by an oath (as in our case) and not involving a Cohein from "ors" accompanied by an oath and not involving a Cohein (as in the case of a pledge). And this is not refuted by the "ors" of a murderer, which are not accompanied by an oath. And it is not refuted by the "ors" of sotah, which, though accompanied by an oath, involve a Cohein.