Brahma Sūtras 2.4

Adhyāya II, Pāda 4

Thus the vital airs. In the third pada it has been shown that a conflict of Vedic passages as to ether, &c., does not exist. The same is now done in this fourth pda with regard to the vital airs. On the one hand the chapters treating of the origin of things do not record an origin of the vital airs; so e.g. (Kh. Up. VI, 2, ' It sent forth fire,' &c.; and (Taitt. Up. II, i) ' From that Self sprang ether,' &c. On the other hand it is said expressly in some places that the vital airs were not produced. The following passage, e. g. ' Non-being indeed was this in the beginning; they say: what was that non-being? those rz'shis indeed were the non-being in the beginning; they say: who are those rz'shis? the vital airs indeed are the rz'shis ' (vSat. Br. VI, i, i, i), states that the vital airs existed before the origin of things.—In other passages again we read of the origin of the vital airs also, so e.g. 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all vital airs come forth from that Self (Brz. Up. II, I, 20); 'From that is born the vital air, mind, and all organs of sense' (Mu. Up. II, i,; 'The seven vital airs also spring from him' (Mu. Up. II, i,; ' He sent forth the vital air; from the vital air j-raddha, ether, air, light, water, earth, sense, mind, food ' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Hence as there is a conflict of scriptural passages, and as no reason can be made out for deciding in favour of either alternative, the purvapakshin thinks that either no opinion can be formed, or that the passages relative to the origin of the vital airs must be taken in a metaphorical sense, since scripture expressly states the prawas to have existed before the creation. In reply to this the author of the Sutras says, ' thus the pra;/as.'—What then, it will be asked, is the fitness of the word ' thus,' as there is no point of comparison with the matter under discussion? The matter under discussion at the conclusion of the preceding pada was the refutation of those who maintain a plurality of omnipresent Selfs, and with this no comparison can be instituted because there is no similarity. For a comparison is possible only where there is similarity; as when we say, e.g. ' as a lion so is Balavarman.' Possibly it might be said that the comparison is meant to intimate similarity with the admh/a; the meaning being that as the adrśha is not limited because it is produced in proximity to all Selfs, so the prâṇas also are not limited with regard to all the different Selfs. But, on that explanation, the Sutra would be an idle repetition, as it has already been explained that that absence of limitation is due to the non-limitation of bodies.—Nor can the prawas be compared with the individual soul, because that would be contrary to the conclusion about to be established. For it has been shown that the individual soul is without an origin, while the intention is to declare that the praas have an origin. Hence it appears that the word ' so ' is devoid of connexion.—Not so, we reply. A connexion may be established by means of a comparison based on the exem-plifying passages. Under that category fall those passages which state the origin of the prâṇas, as e. g. ' From that Self come forth all prawas, all worlds, all gods, all beings' (Bri. Up. II, I,; which passage means that as the worlds and so on are produced from the highest Brahman so the pri/as also. Such passages also as (Mu. Up. II, i, ' From him are born praæa, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth the support of all,' are to be considered as intimating that the origin of the prâṇas is analogous to that of the ether, &c.—Or else, as a connexion with a somewhat remote object of comparison is resorted to in such cases as the one treated of in Pu. Mi. Su. III, 4, 32 (' and the accident in drinking Soma, in the same manner'), we may construe our Sutra in the following way: in the same way as ether and so on, which are mentioned in the beginning of the preceding pada, are understood to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the prâṇas also are effects of the highest Brahman. And if it be asked what reason we have for assuming the prâṇas to be so, we reply: the fact of this being stated by scripture.—But it has been shown above that in some places the origin of the prâṇas is not mentioned.—That is of no weight, we reply, as it is mentioned in other places. For the circumstance of a thing not being stated in some places has no power to invalidate what is stated about it in other places. Hence, on account of equality of scriptural statement, it is proper to maintain that the prâṇas also are produced in the same way as ether and so on.

On account of the impossibility of a secondary (origin of the prâṇas). Against the objection that the origin of the prawas must be understood in a secondary sense because the text states that they existed before the origin of the world, the Sutrakara declares ' on account of the impossibility of a secondary origin.' The statement as to the origin of the praas cannot be taken in a secondary sense because therefrom would result the abandonment of a general assertion. For after the text has asserted that the knowledge of everything depends on the knowledge of one (' What is that through which when it is known everything else becomes known? ' Mu. Up. I, i, 3), it goes on to say, in order to prove that assertion, that ' From him is born prawa,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, i, 3). Now the assertion is made good only if the whole world including the prâṇas is an effect of Brahman, because then there is no effect independent of the material cause; if on the other hand the statement as to the origin of the prâṇas were taken in a secondary sense, the assertion would thereby be stultified. The text, moreover, makes some concluding statements about the matter asserted, ' The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal' (II, i, 10), and ' Brahman alone is all this; it is the Best.'—That same assertion is to be connected with such passages as the following, ' When we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self, then all this is known ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 5).—How then have we to account for the statement that the prawas existed before the creation?—That statement, we reply, does not refer to the fundamental causal substance; for we ascertain from scriptural passages, such as Mu. Up. II, i, (' That heavenly Person is without breath and without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable'), that the fundamental causal substance is devoid of all distinctions such as breath and the like. We must rather view the statement about the existence of the prâṇas before the creation as having for its object a subordinate causal substance, and being made with reference to the effects of the latter only. For it is known from ruti and Smrz'ti that even in the universe of evolved things many states of being may stand to each other in the relation of causal substance and effect.—In the adhikarawa treating of the ether there occurred a Sutra (composed of the same syllables) ' gau/zyasambhavat,' which as being the purvapaksha-sutra had to be explained as ' gauwi asambhavat,' ' the statement about the origin of ether must be taken in a secondary sense on account of the impossibility (of the primary sense).' There the final conclusion was established by means of the abandonment of the general assertion. Here on the other hand the Sutra is the Siddhanta Sutra and we have therefore explained it as meaning ' on account of the impossibility of a secondary meaning.'—Those who explain the present Sutra in the same way as the previous Sutra overlook the fact of the general assertion being abandoned (viz. if the passages referring to the origin of the prâṇas were taken in a secondary sense).

On account of that (word which indicates origin) being enunciated at first (in connexion with the prâṇas). That the scriptural statement about the origin of the prâṇas is to be taken in its literal sense just as the statements about the ether, &c., appears from that circumstance also that the one word which (in the passage from the Mu. Up.) indicates origination, viz. ' is born ' (yate), is in the first place connected with the prâṇas and has afterwards to be joined with ether, &c., also (' from him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air,' &c.). Now as it is a settled matter that the phrase ' is born ' must be taken in its primary sense with reference to ether and so on, it follows that the origin of the pra;zas also to which the same word is applied must be understood as a real origin. For it would be impossible to decide that a word enunciated once only in one chapter and one sentence, and connected with many other words, has in some cases to be taken in its primary sense, and in others in a secondary sense; for such a decision would imply want of uniformity.—So likewise in the passage, ' He sent forth pra//a, from pra;/a jraddha,' &c. (Pr. Up. VI, 4), the phrase 'he sent forth' which the text exhibits in conjunction with the prâṇas has to be carried on to j-raddha and the other things which have an origin.—The same reasoning holds good in those cases where the word expressing origination occurs at the end and has to be connected with the preceding words; as e. g. in the passage ending ' all beings come forth from the Self,' where the word ' come forth ' must be connected with the prâṇas, &c., mentioned in the earlier part of the sentence.

Because speech is preceded by that (viz, fire and the other elements). Although in the chapter, ' That sent forth fire,' &c., the origin of the prâṇas is not mentioned, the origin of the three elements, fire, water, and earth only being stated, nevertheless, the fact of the text declaring that speech, pra;/a, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth—which in their turn have Brahman for their causal substance—proves that they—and, by parity of reasoning, all pra;/as—have sprung from Brahman. That speech, prawa, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth is told in the same chapter, ' For truly, my child, mind consists of earth, breath of water. speech of fire ' (Kh. Up. VI, 5, 4). If their consisting of earth and so on is taken literally, it follows at once that they have sprung from Brahman. And if it be taken in a metaphorical sense only, yet, as the sentence forms part of the chapter which treats of the evolution of names and forms effected by Brahman; and as the introductory phrase runs, ' That by which we hear what is not heard ' (Kh. Up. VI, I,; and as the concluding passage is 'In it all that exists has its Self [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); and as the matter is moreover known from other scriptural passages; we understand that also the statement about mind and so on consisting of earth, &c., is meant to teach that they are products of Brahman.—It is therefore an established conclusion that the prâṇas also are effects of Brahman.

(The prâṇas are) seven, on account of this being understood (from scriptural passages) and of the specification (of those seven). So far we have shown that there is in reality no conflict of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the prawas. It will now be shown that there is also no conflict regarding their number. The chief vital air (mukhya pra;?a) will be discussed later on. For the present the Sutrakara defines the number of the other prâṇas. A doubt arises here owing to the conflicting nature of the scriptural passages. In one place seven prdæas are mentioned, ' The seven prawas spring from him' (Mu. Up. II, t, 8). In another place eight prawas are mentioned as being grahas, ' Eight grahas there are and eight atigrahas ' (Brz. Up. III, 2, i). In another place nine, ' Seven are the prâṇas of the head, two the lower ones ' (Taitt. Saṃh. V, 3, 2, 5). Sometimes ten, ' Nine prâṇas indeed are in men, the navel is the tenth ' (Taitt. Sa7æh. V, 3, 2, 3). Sometimes eleven, ' Ten are these prawas in man, and Atman is the eleventh' (Brz. Up. III, 9, 4). Sometimes twelve, ' All touches have their centre in the skin,' &c. (Br/. Up. II, 4, 11). Sometimes thirteen, ' The eye and what can be seen,' &c. (Pr. Up. IV, 8).—Thus the scriptural passages disagree about the number of the prawas. So Here the purvapakshin maintains that the prâṇas are in reality seven in number, on account of understanding, i. e. because they are understood to be so many, from passages such as ' The seven prâṇas spring from him/ &c. These seven prawas are moreover specified in the other passage quoted above, 'Seven indeed are the prâṇas of the head.'—But in the same passage we meet with the following reiteration, ' Resting in the cave they are placed there seven and seven,' which intimates that there are prawas in addition to the seven.—No matter, we reply; that reiteration is made with reference to the plurality of men, and means that each man has seven prawas; it does not mean that there are two sets of seven prdæas each of different nature.—But, another objection will be raised other scriptural passages speak of the prawas as eight in number; how then should they be seven?—True, we reply, the number of eight also is stated; but on account of the contradictory nature of the statements we have to decide in favour of either of the two numbers; hence we decide in favour of the number seven, in deference to the (simpler) assumption of a low number, and consider the statements of other numbers to refer to the difference of modifications (of the fundamental seven praæas).—To this argumentation the next Sutra replies.

But (there are also, in addition to the seven pra;2as mentioned,) the hands and so on. This being a settled matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude) thus (viz. that there are seven prâṇas only). In addition to the seven prawas scripture mentions other praas also, such as the hands, &c., ' The hand is one graha and that is seized by work as the atigraha; for with the hands one does work' (Br/. Up. III, 2, 8), and similar passages. And as it is settled that there are more than seven, the number seven may be explained as being contained within the greater number. For wherever there is a conflict between a higher and a lower number, the higher number has to be accepted because the lower one is contained within it; while the higher is not contained within the lower. We therefore must not conclude that, in deference to the lower number, seven prâṇas have to be assumed, but rather that there are eleven prawas, in deference to the higher number. This conclusion is confirmed by one of the passages quoted, ' Ten are these prâṇas in man, and Atman is the eleventh.' By the word Atman we have to understand the internal organ, on account of its ruling over the organs. Should it be objected that scripture also mentions numbers higher than eleven, viz. twelve and thirteen, we admit that, but remark that there are no objective effects in addition to the eleven (well-known) objective effects on account of which additional organs would have to be assumed. There are five distinctions of buddhi having for their respective objects sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, and on their account there are the five intellectual organs; again there are five classes of action, viz. speaking, taking, going, evacuation, and begetting, and on their account there are the five organs of action; finally there is the manas which has all things for its objects and extends to the past, the present, and the future; it is one only but has various functions. On account of the plurality of its functions we find it designated by different terms in different places, as manas or buddhi or aha;;zkara or -itta. Thus scripture also after having enumerated the various functions such as desire, &c., says at the end, 'All this is manas only.'—That passage again which speaks of the prâṇas of the head as seven means four prawas only, which on account of the plurality of their places may be counted as seven; viz. the two ears, the two eyes, the two nostrils, and speech.—Nor can it be maintained that there are in reality only so many (i.e. seven), the other prâṇas being mere functions of the seven; for the functions of the hands and so on are absolutely different (from the functions of the seven senses admitted by the purvapakshin).—Again, in the passage ' Nine prawas indeed are in man, the navel is the tenth,' the expression ' ten prâṇas ' is used to denote the different openings of the human body, not the difference of nature of the prâṇas, as we conclude from the navel being mentioned as the eleventh. For no praæa is known that bears the name of navel; but the navel as being one of the special abodes of the chief praæa is here enu- G merated as a tenth pra//a.—In some places so and so many are counted for the purpose of meditation; in other places so and so many for the purpose of illustration. As the statements concerning the number of the prâṇas are of so varying a nature we must therefore distinguish in each case what the object of the statement is. Meanwhile it remains a settled conclusion that that statement which makes the prâṇas to be eleven is authoritative, on account of the objective effects (being eleven also). The two Sutras (referring to the number of the pranas) may be construed in the following manner also. The prawas are seven because scripture mentions the going (gati) of seven only, ' When he thus departs life departs after him, and when life thus departs all the other przas depart after it ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 2).—But, it may be objected, this passage says 'all the other prâṇas; ' how then does it declare the going of seven only?—The Sutra replies, 'on account of their being specified.' Seven senses only, from seeing up to feeling, are specified there because so many only are under discussion; as w'e see from the enumeration given in the passage, ' When that person in the eye turns away then he ceases -to know any forms. He has become one they say, he does not see ' &c. The word ' all ' refers here only to what is under discussion, i.e. only to the seven prâṇas mentioned before, not to any other. Analogously when we say ' all the Brahmawas have been fed,' we mean only those Brâhmaṇas who have been invited and concern us at the time not any other.—If it be objected that the passage quoted mentions understanding (vi;7ana) as the eighth thing departing, and that we therefore have no right to speak of the departing of seven only, we reply that manas and understanding differ not in essential nature but only in function, and that on this account we are entitled to speak of seven prâṇas only.—The answer to this purvapaksha is as follows.—In addition to the seven senses, other prawas also, such as the hands, are known to exist, as we see from such passages as ' The hands are one graha,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, a, 8). By their being a graha (seizer) is meant that they are bonds by which the individual soul (kshetra;/a) is tied. Now the individual soul is tied not in one body only, but is equally tied in other bodies also. Hence it follows that that bond called graha (i.e. among other things the hands) moves over into other bodies also. Smrzti also (' He—the Self—is joined with the aggregate of eight, comprising breath, &c., as his mark; his bondage consists in being bound by it, his release in being freed from it ') shows that the Self is, previous to final release, not freed from the bonds called grahas. And also in the enumeration of the senses and their objects given by the Atharva;/a Upanishad (' The eye and what can be seen,' &c., Pr. Up. IV, 8), the organs of action such as the hands and so on, together with their objects, are specified as well, 'the hands and what can be grasped; the member and what can be delighted; the anus and what can be evacuated; the feet and what can be walked.' Moreover the passage, These ten vital breaths and atman as the eleventh; when they depart from this mortal body they make us cry' (Bri. Up. III, 9,4), shows that eleven prâṇas depart from the body.—Moreover the word ' all ' (which occurs in the passage, Br/. Up. IV, 4,2) must, because connected with the word 'prawas,' denote all prâṇas, and cannot, on the ground of general subject-matter, be limited to the seven prawas; for a direct statement has greater force than the subject-matter. Even in the analogous sentence, 'all Brahmawas have been fed,' we have, on the ground of the words, to understand all Brahmawas living on the earth; but because it is impossible to feed all Brâhmaṇas in the latter sense, we accept that meaning of 'all,' according to which it denotes all invited Brâhmaṇas. In our case on the other hand there is no reason whatever for narrowing the meaning of 'all.'—Hence the word 'all ' includes all prâṇas without exception. Nothing on the other hand prevents the enumeration of seven prawas being taken as illustrative only. It is therefore an established conclusion, resting on the number of the effects as well as on Vedic statement, that there are eleven prâṇas.

And (they are) minute. The author of the Sutras adds another characteristic quality of the pr 4 æas. The prâṇas under discussion must be viewed as minute. By their minuteness we have to understand subtilty and limited size; but not atomic size, as otherwise they would be incapable of producing effects which extend over the whole body. They must be subtle; for if they were big the persons surrounding a dying man would see them coming out from the body at the moment of death, as a snake comes out of its hole. They must be limited; for if they were all-pervading the scriptural statements as to their passing out of the body, going and coming, would be contradicted thereby, and it could not be established that the individual soul is ' the essence of the qualities of that ' (i. e. the manas; cp. II, 3, 29). Should it be said that they may be all-pervading, but at the same time appear as functions (vr/tti) in the body only, we rejoin that only a function can constitute an instrument. Whatever effects perception, may it be a function or something else, just that is an instrument for us. The disagreement is therefore about a name only, and the assumption of the instruments (prawas) being all-pervading is thus purposeless.—Hence we decide that the prawas are subtle and of limited size.

And the best (i.e. the chief vital air). The Sutra extends to the chief vital air (mukhya pra;/a) a quality already asserted of the other prâṇas, viz. being an effect of Brahman.—But, an objection may be raised, it has already been stated of all prawas without difference that they are effects of Brahman; e. g. the passage, ' From him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense ' (Mu. Up. II, I, 3), states the origin of pra;a separately from the senses and the manas; and there are other passages also such as ' He sent forth pra;/a ' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Why then the formal extension?—We reply: For the purpose of removing further doubt. For in the Nasadiya-sukta whose subject is Brahman there occurs the following mantra: ' There was neither death nor the Immortal; nor manifestation of either night or day. By its own law the One was breathing without wind; there was nothing different from that or higher than it' (Ri. Sa;?zh. X, 129, 2). Here the words, ' was breathing,' which denote the proper function of breath, intimate that breath existed as it were before the creation. And therefrom it might be concluded that pra;/a is not produced; an idea which the Sutrakdra discards by the formal extension (to pra/a of the quality of having originated from Brahman).—Moreover the word ' breathed ' does not intimate that pra;/a existed before the creation; for in the first place it is qualified by the addition 'without wind,' and in the second place scriptural passages—such as ' He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, i,—declare expressly that the causal substance is without any qualifications such as pra;/a and so on. Hence the word ' breathed ' has merely the purpose of setting forth the existence of the cause.—The term ' the best ' (employed in the Sutra) denotes the chief vital air, according to the declaration of scripture, ' Breath indeed is the oldest and the best ' [Kh. Up. V, i, i). The breath is the oldest because it begins its function from the moment when the child is conceived; the senses of hearing, &c., on the other hand, begin to act only when their special seats, viz. the ears, &c., are formed, and they are thus not ' the oldest.' The designation ' the best ' belongs to the prawa on account of its superior qualities and on account of the passage, ' We shall not be able to live without thee' (Brz. Up. VI, i, 13).

(The chief praa is) neither air nor function, on account of its being mentioned separately. An inquiry is now started concerning the nature of that chief pra;/a.—The purvapakshin maintains that the pra;/a is, according to 5ruti, nothing but air. For vSruti says, ' Breath is air; that air assuming five forms is pra;/a, apana, vyana, udana, samana.'—Or else the purvapaksha may be formulated according to the view of another philosophical doctrine, and prkna. may be considered as the combined function of all organs. For so the followers of another doctrine (viz. the Sankhyas) teach, ' The five airs, pra;/a,&c.,are the common function of the instruments.' To this we reply that the praæa is neither air nor the function of an organ; for it is mentioned separately. From air pra;a is distinguished in the following passage, Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman. That foot shines as Agni with its light and warms.' If prawa were mere air, it would not be mentioned separately from air.—Thus it is also mentioned separately from the functions of the organs; for the texts enumerate speech and the other organs and mention prawa separately from them, and the function and that to which the function belongs (the organ) are identical. If it were a mere function of an organ, it would not be mentioned separately from the organs. Other passages also in which the pra;/a is mentioned separately from air and the organs are here to be considered so, e. g. ' From him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, i, 3). Nor is it possible that all the organs together should have one function (and that that function should be the pra;/a); for each organ has its own special function and the aggregate of them has no active power of its own.—But—an objection may be raised—the thing may take place in the manner of the moving bird-cage. Just as eleven birds shut up in one cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move the cage by the combination of their efforts; so the eleven prawas which abide in one body may, although each has its own special function, by the combination of these functions, produce one common function called praæa.—This objection, we reply, is without force. The birds indeed may, by means of their separate subordinate efforts, which all favour the movement of the cage, move the cage by combination; that is a matter of observation. But we have no right to assume that the different prâṇas with their subordinate functions such as hearing &c. can, by combination, produce the function of vital breath; for there is no means to prove this, and the vital breath is in kind absolutely different from hearing and so on.—Moreover, if the vital breath were the mere function of an organ (or the organs) it could not be glorified as the ' best,' and speech and so on could not be represented as subordinate to it. Hence the vital breath is different from air and the functions (of the organs).—How then have we to understand the scriptural passage, 'The prkna is air/ &c.?— The air, we reply, passing into the adhyatma-state, dividing itself fivefold and thus abiding in a specialized condition is called pra/za. It therefore is neither a different being nor is it mere air. Hence there is room for those passages as well which identify it with air as those which do not.—Well, let this be granted. The pra;/a then also must be considered to be independent in this body like the individual soul, as scripture declares it to be the ' best and the organs such as speech, &c., to be subordinate to it. For various powers are ascribed to it in scriptural passages. It is said, for instance, that when speech and the other (organs) are asleep the pra;/a alone is awake; that the priwa alone is not reached by death; that the pra;;a is the absorber, it absorbs speech, &c.; that the pra/za guards the other senses (prawas) as a mother her sons. Hence it follows that the pr 4 æa is independent in the same way as the individual soul.—This view is impugned in the next Sfitra.

But (the prAæa is subordinate to the soul) like the eye, &c., on account of being taught with them (the eye, &c.), and for other reasons. The word ' but ' sets aside the independence of the prana. As the eye and so on stand, like the subjects of a king, in mere subordinate relation to the acting and enjoying of the soul and are not independent, so the chief vital air also, occupying a position analogous to that of a king's minister, stands in an entirely subordinate relation to the soul and is not independent.—Why?—Because it is taught (spoken of) together with them, i. e. the eye and the other organs, in such passages as the colloquy of the prâṇas, &c. For to be mentioned together is appropriate only in the case of things with the same attributes, as e. g. the Brzliatsaman and the Rathantara-saman. The words 'and so on ' (in the Sutra) indicate other reasons refuting the independence of the pra;?a, such as its being composed of parts, its being of a non-intelligent nature and the like.—Well, but if it be admitted that the primâ stands to the soul in the relation of an instrument as the eye and so on, it will follow that we must assume another sense-object analogous to colour and so on. For the eyes, &c., occupy their specific subordinate position with regard to the soul through their functions which consist in the seeing of colour and so on. Now we can enumerate only eleven classes of functions, viz. the seeing of colour and so on, on whose account we assume eleven different praas, and there is no twelfth class of effects on account of which a twelfth pra;a could be assumed.—To this objection the following Sutra replies.

And on account of (its) not being an instrument the objection is not (valid); for thus (scripture) declares. The objection urged, viz. that there would result another sense-object, is not valid; because the pra;/a is not an instrument. For we do not assume that the pra;/a is, like the eye, an organ because it determines a special sense-object. Nor is it on that account devoid of an effect; since scripture declares that the chief vital air has a specific effect which cannot belong to the other prâṇas. For in the so-called colloquies of the prâṇas we read in the beginning, ' The prâṇas quarrelled together who was best; ' after that we read, He by whose departure the body seems worse than worst, he is the best of you; ' thereupon the text, after showing how, on the successive departure of speech and so on, the life of the body, although deprived of one particular function, went on as before, finally relates that as soon as the chief pra;?a was about to depart all other prâṇas became loosened and the body was about to perish; which shows that the body and all the senses subsist by means of the chief pra;/a. The same thing is declared by another passage, ' Then pr 4 æa as the best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it' (Pr. Up. II, 3). Another passage, viz. ' With prawa guarding the lower nest ' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 12), shows that the guarding of the body depends on prawa. Again, two other passages show that the nourish-ing of the body depends on praæa, ' From whatever limb prana goes away that limb withers' (Brf. Up. I, 3, 19), and ' What we eat and drink with it supports the other vital breaths.' And another passage declares that the soul's departing and staying depend on pra;/a, ' What is it by whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall stay?—The created prawa ' (Pr. Up. VI, 3; 4).

It is designated as having five functions like mind. The chief vital air has its specific effect for that reason also that in scripture it is designated as having five functions, prawa, apana, vyana, udana, samana. This distinction of functions is based on a distinction of effects. Prawa is the forward-function whose work is aspiration, &c.; apana is the backward-function whose work is inspiration, &c.; vyana is that which, abiding in the junction of the two. is the cause of works of strength; uddna is the ascending function and is the cause of the passing out (of the soul); samana is the function which conveys the juices of the food equally through all the limbs of the body. Thus the pra;/a has five functions just as the mind (manas) has. The five functions of the mind are the five well-known ones caused by the ear, &c., and having sound and so on for their objects. By the functions of the mind we cannot here understand those enumerated (in Br/. Up. I, 5, 3), 'desire, representation,' &c., because those are more than five.—But on the former explanation also there exists yet another function of the mind which does not depend on the ear, &c., but has for its object the past, the future, and so on; so that on that explanation also the number five is exceeded.—Well, let us then follow the principle that the opinions of other (systems) if unobjectionable may be adopted, and let us assume that the five functions of the manas are those five which are known from the Yogaj-astra, viz. right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber, and remembrance. Or else let us assume that the Sutra quotes the manas as an analogous instance merely with reference to the plurality (not the fivefoldness) of its functions.—In any case the Sutra must be construed to mean that the pra;/a's subordinate position with regard to the soul follows from its having five functions like the manas.

And it is minute. And the chief vital air is to be considered as minute like the other pra;/as.—Here also we have to understand by minuteness that the chief vital air is subtle and of limited size, not that is of atomic size; for by means of its five functions it pervades the entire body. It must be viewed as subtle because when passing out of the body it is not perceived by a bystander, and as limited because scripture speaks of its passing out, going and coming.—But, it may be said, scripture speaks also of its all-pervadingness; so, Viz. the holding in of the breath; cp. Kh. Up. I, 3, 3-5. e. g. ' He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this Universe' (Br/. Up. I, 3, 22).—To this we reply that the all-pervadingness of which this text speaks belongs to the Self of the pra;/a in its adhidaivata relation, according to which it appears as Hirawyagarbha in his double—universal and individual—form, not in its adhydtma relation. Moreover the statements of equality ' equal to a grub,' &c., just declare the limited size of the pra;/a which abides within every living being.—Thus there remains no difficulty.

But there is guidance (of the prâṇas) by fire, &c., on account of that being declared by scripture. Here there arises a discussion whether the prâṇas of which we have been treating are able to produce their effects by their own power or only in so far as guided by divinities.—The purvapakshin maintains that the pr4æas being endowed with the capacity of producing their effects act from their own power. If we, moreover, admitted that the prâṇas act only in so far as guided by divinities, it would follow that those guiding divinities are the enjoyers (of the fruits of the actions), and the individual soul would thus cease to be an enjoyer. Hence the prâṇas act from their own power.—To this we reply as follows. ' But there takes place guidance by fire,' &c.—The word ' but ' excludes the purvapaksha. The different classes of organs, speech, &c., the Shtra says, enter on their peculiar activities, guided by the divinities animating fire, and so on. The words, ' on account of that being declared by scripture,' state the reason. For different passages declare this, cp. Ait. Ar, II, 4, 2, 4, ' Agni having become speech entered the mouth.' This statement about Agni (fire) becoming speech and entering the mouth is made on the assumption of Agni acting as a ruler with his divine Self (not as a mere element). For if we abstract from the connexion with the divinity we do not see that there is any special connexion of fire either with speech or the mouth. The subsequent passages, ' Vayu having become breath entered into the nostrils,' &c., are to be explained in the same way.—This conclusion is confirmed by other passages also, such as ' Speech is indeed the fourth foot of Brahman; that foot shines with Agni as its light and warms ' (Kh. Up. IV, 1 8, 3), which passage declares that speech is made of the light of Agni. Other passages intimate the same thing by declaring that speech, &c., pass over into Agni, &c., cp. Brz. Up. I, 3, 12, 'He carried speech across first; when speech had become freed from death it became Agni.' Everywhere the enumeration of speech and so on on the one side and Agni and so on on the other side—wherein is implied a distinction of the personal and the divine element—proceeds on the ground of the same relation (viz. of that which is guided and that which guides). Smr/ti-passages also declare at length that speech, &c., are guided by Agni and the other divinities, cp. for instance, ' Brahmawas knowing the truth call speech the personal element, that which is spoken the natural element and fire (Agni) the divine element.'—The assertion that the pri;zas being endowed with the capability of producing their effects act from their own power is unfounded, as we see that some things which possess the capability of motion, e. g. cars, actually move only if dragged by bulls and the like. Hence, as both alternatives are possible we decide on the ground of scripture that the prawas act under the guidance of the divinities.—The next Sutra refutes the assertion that from the fact of the divinities guiding the prâṇas it would follow that they—and not the embodied soul—are the enjoyers.

(It is not so) (because the prâṇas are connected) with that to which the prâṇas belong (i.e. the individual soul), (a thing we know) from scripture. Although there are divinities guiding the prawas, yet we learn from scripture that those prâṇas are connected with the embodied soul which is the Lord of the aggregate of instruments of action. The following passage, e.g. 'where the sight has entered into the void there is the person of the eye; the eye itself is the instrument of seeing. He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self; the nose is the instrument of smelling,' declares that the prâṇas are connected with the embodied soul only. Moreover the plurality of the divinities guiding the organs renders it impossible that they should be the enjoyers in this body. For that there is in this body only one embodied enjoyer is understood from the possibility of the recognition of identity and so on.

And on account of the permanence of this (viz. the embodied soul). This embodied soul abides permanently in this body as the enjoyer, since it can be affected by good and evil and can experience pleasure and pain. Not so the gods; for they exist in the state of highest power and glory and cannot possibly enter, in this wretched body, into the condition of enjoyers. So scripture also says, ' Only what is good approaches him; verily evil does not approach the devas ' (Br/. Up. I, 5, 20).—And only with the embodied soul the prâṇas are permanently connected, as it is seen that when the soul passes out &c. the pr/zas follow it. This we see from passages such as the following: 'When it passes out the pra;za passes out after it, and when the prawa thus passes out all the other prâṇas pass after it' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 2). Hence although there are ruling divinities of the organs, the embodied soul does not cease to be the enjoyer; for the divinities are connected with the organs only, not with the state of the soul as enjoyer.

They (the prâṇas) are senses, on account of being so designated, with the exception of the best (the mukhya pra;a). We have treated of the mukhya praæa and the other eleven prâṇas in due order.—Now there arises another doubt, viz. whether the other prâṇas are functions of the mukhya prawa or different beings.—The purvapakshin maintains that they are mere functions, on account of scriptural statement. For scripture, after having spoken of the chief pra;/a and the other prâṇas in proximity, declares that those other prawas have their Self in the chief prawa, ' Well, let us all assume his form. Thereupon they all assumed his form ' (Br/. Up. I, 5, 2i).—Their unity is moreover ascertained from the unity of the term applied to them, viz. primâ. Otherwise there either would result the objectionable circumstance of one word having different senses, or else the word would in some places have to be taken in its primary sense, in others in a derived sense. Hence, as pra;/a, apana, &c. are the five functions of the one chief pra;/a, so the eleven prawas also which begin with speech are mere functions of the chief pra;/a.—To this we reply as follows. Speech and so on are beings different from the chief pra;/a, on account of the difference of designation.—Which is that difference of designation?—The eleven prâṇas remaining if we abstract from the best one, i.e. the chief pra;/a, are called the sense-organs (indriya), as we see them designated in S'ruti, ' from him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense ' (Mu. Up. II, I, 3). In this and other passages praæa and the sense-organs are mentioned separately.—But in that case the mind also would have to be excluded from the class of sense-organs, like the praæa; as we see that like the latter it is separately mentioned in the passage, ' The mind and all organs of sense.' True; but in Smr/ti eleven sense-organs are mentioned, and on that account the mind must, like the ear, and so on, be comprised in the sense-organs. That the pra?/a on the other hand is a sense-organ is known neither from Smrz'ti nor 6"ruti.—Now this difference of designation is appropriate only if there is difference of being. If there were unity of being it would be contradictory that the prawa although one should sometimes be designated as sense-organ and sometimes not. Consequently the other prawas are different in being from the chief pra;/a.—For this conclusion the following Sutra states an additional reason.

On account of the scriptural statement of difference. The pra;/a is everywhere spoken of as different from speech, &c. The passage, e.g. beginning with ' They said to speech ' (Brz. Up. I, 3, 2), enumerates speech, &c., which were overwhelmed by the evil of the Asuras, concludes thereupon the section treating of speech, &c., and then specially mentions the mukhya praæa as overcoming the Asuras, in the paragraph beginning ' Then they said to the breath in the mouth,'—Other passages also referring to that difference maybe quoted, so, for instance, ' He made mind, speech, and breath for himself (Brz. Up. I, 5, 3).—For this reason also the other prâṇas are different in being from the chief pra;/a.—Another reason follows.

And on account of the difference of characteristics. There is moreover a difference of characteristics between the chief praa and the other prawas. When speech &c. are asleep, the chief pr;/a alone is awake. The chief prana. alone is not reached by death, while the other prâṇas are. The staying and departing of the chief prawa—not that of the sense-organs—is the cause of the maintenance and the destruction of the body. The sense-organs, on the other hand, are the cause of the perception of the sense-objects, not the chief pra;/a. Thus there are manifold differences distinguishing the praæa from the senses, and this also shows the latter to be different in being from the praæa.—To infer from the passage, ' thereupon they all assumed his form,' that the sense-organs are nothing but praæa is wrong, because there also an examination of the context makes us understand their difference. For there the sense-organs are enumerated first ('Voice held, I shall speak/ &c.); after that it is said that speech, &c. were seized by death in the form of weariness (' Death having become weariness held them back; therefore speech grows weary '); finally pra;/a is mentioned separately as not having been overcome by death (' but death did not seize the central breath ' and is asserted to be the best (' he is the best of us '). The assuming of the form of prawa has therefore, in accordance with the quoted passages, to be understood to mean that the energizing of speech and so on depends on the pra;za, but not that they are identical with it.—Hence it follows that the word 'pra;za' is applied to the sense-organs in a secondary sense. Thus.S'ruti also says, 'Thereupon they all assumed his form, and therefore they are called after him prâṇas;' a passage declaring that the word prawa, which properly refers to the chief prawa, is secondarily applied to the sense-organs also. Speech and the other sense-organs are therefore different in being from the praæa.

But the fashioning of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, on account of the teaching (of scripture). In the chapter treating of the Being (sat), subsequently to the account of the creation of fire, water, and food (earth), the following statement is made, ' That divinity thought, let me now enter those three beings with this living Self (iva atma), and let me then evolve names and forms;—let me make each of these three tripartite ' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2; 3).—Here the doubt arises whether the agent in that evolution of names and forms is theiva (the living, i.e. the individual Self or soul) or the highest Lord.—The purvapakshin maintains the former alternative, on account of the qualification contained in the words 'with this living Self The use of ordinary language does, in such phrases as ' Having entered the army of the enemy by means of a spy I count it,' attribute the counting of the army in which the spy is the real agent to the Self of the king who is the causal agent; which attribution is effected by means of the use of the first person, ' I count.' So here the sacred text attributes the evolving of names and forms—in which the iva is the real agent—to the Self of the divinity which is the causal agent; the attribution being effected by means of the use of the first person, ' let me evolve.'—Moreover we see in the case of names such as Zittha, Zavittha, &c., and in the case of forms such as jars, dishes and the like that the individual soul only is the evolving agent. Hence the evolution of names and forms is the work of theiva. To this the Sutra replies: 'But the fashioning of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite.' The particle ' but ' discards the purvapaksha. Fashioning means evolving. The term ' he who renders tripartite ' denotes the highest Lord, his agency being designated as beyond contradiction in the case of the rendering tripartite (of fire, &c.). The entire evolution of names and forms which is seen, e.g. in fire, sun, moon, lightning, or in different plants such as kuj-a-grass, kaj-a-grass, palaj-a-trees, or in various living beings such as cattle, deer, men, all this manifold evolution according to species and individuals can surely be the work of the highest Lord only, who fashioned fire, water, and earth.—Why?—On account of the teaching of the sacred text.—For the text says at first ' that divinity,' &c., and then goes on in the first person ' let me evolve; ' which implies the statement that the highest Brahman only is the evolving agent.—But we ascertain from the qualification contained in the words ' with this living Self,' that the agent in the evolution is the living Self!—No, we reply. The words 'with this living Self are connected with the words ' having entered,' in proximity to which they stand; not with the clause ' let me evolve.' If they were connected with the former words, we should have to assume that the first person, which refers to the divinity—viz. ' let me evolve—is used in a metaphorical sense. And with regard to all the manifold names and forms such as mountains, rivers, oceans, &c., no soul, apart from the Lord, possesses the power of evolution; and if any have such power, it is dependent on the highest Lord. Nor is the so-called ' living Self absolutely different from the highest Lord, as the spy is from the king; as we see from its being qualified as the living Self, and as its being theiva (i. e. an individual soul apparently differing from the universal Self) is due to the limiting adjuncts only. Hence the evolution of names and forms which is effected by it is in reality effected by the highest Lord. And that the highest Lord is he who evolves the names and forms is a principle acknowledged by all the Upanishads; as we see from such passages as 'He who is called ether is the evolver of all forms and names ' [Kh. Up. VHI, 14). The evolution of names and forms, therefore, is exclusively the work of the highest Lord, who is also the author of the tripartite arrangement.—The meaning of the text is that the evolution of names and forms was preceded by the tripartition, the evolution of each particular name and form being already explained by the account of the origin of fire, water, and earth. The act of tripartition is expressly described by ruti in the cases of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, ' The red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour of water, the black colour of fire the colour of earth,' &c. In this way there is evolved the distinctive form of fire, and in connexion therewith the distinctive name ' fire,' the name depending on the thing. The same remarks apply to the cases of the sun, the moon, and lightning. The instance (given by the text) of the tripartition of fire implies the statement that the three substances, viz. earth, water, fire, were rendered tripartite in the same manner; as the beginning as well as the concluding clause of the passage equally refers to all three. For the beginning clause says, ' These three beings became each of them tripartite; ' and the concluding clause says, ' Whatever they thought looked red they knew was the colour of fire,' &c. &c., up to ' Whatever they thought was altogether unknown they knew was some combination of these three beings.' Having thus described the external tripartition of the three elements the text goes on to describe another tripartition with reference to man, ' those three beings when they reach man become each of them tripartite.' This tripartition in man the teacher sets forth (in the following Sutra) according to scripture, with a view to the refutation of some foreseen objection.

The flesh, &c., originates from earth, according to the scriptural statement; and (so also) in the case of the two other (elements). From tripartite earth when assimilated by man there are produced as its effects flesh, &c., according to scripture. For the text says, ' Food (earth) when eaten becomes threefold; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind.' The meaning is that the tripartite earth is eaten in the shape of food such as rice, barley, &c.; that its grossest parts are discharged in the form of feces, that its middle parts nourish the flesh of the body, and its subtlest parts feed the mind. Analogously we have to learn from the text the effects of the two other elements, viz. fire and water; viz. that urine, blood, and breath are the effects of water; bone, marrow, and speech those of fire.—Here now an objection is raised. If all material things are tripartite (i.e. contain parts of the three elements alike)—according to the indifferent statement, ' He made each of these tripartite'—for what reason then has there been made the distinction of names, ' this is fire, this is water, this is earth? ' And again, why is it said that among the elements of the human body, flesh, &c., is the effect of the eaten earth only; blood, &c., the effect of the water drunk; bone, &c., the effect of the fire eaten?—To this objection the next Sutra replies.

But on account of their distinctive nature there is a (distinctive) designation of them. The word ' but ' repels the objection raised. By ' distinctive nature' we have to understand preponderance. Although all things are tripartite, yet we observe in different places a preponderance of different elements; heat preponderates in fire, water in all that is liquid, food in earth. This special tripartition aims at rendering possible the distinctions and terms of ordinary life. For if the tripartition resulted in sameness, comparable to that of the three strands of a tripartite rope, we could not distinguish—and speak of as distinguished—the three elements.—Hence, vedanta-sOtras, although there is a tripartition, we are enabled ' on account of distinctive nature ' to give special designations to the three elements, viz. fire, water, and earth and their products.—The repetition (of ' designation of them ') indicates the termination of the adhyaya.